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In this paper I would like to discuss a particular set of performative 
subjectivities, the subject produced in gender passing. Passing is a term 
originally used in the context of race, bút has been recently extended to 
cover other forms of boundary crossings. As a generál term, it involves 
various, often multiple transgressions between the binary oppositions of 
man/woman, white/black, or heterosexual/homosexual. Gender passing 
comes about predominantly through the dramatic or theatrical replaying 
of existing social Scripts, uncovering the purely imitative and constructed 
natúré of gender by ignoring, transforming, or literally re-dressing the 
“biological.” In other words, these are performances where the binaries of 
feminine/masculine leave the body marked as their “natural” site and 
become staged or acted out. In such instances of passing, gender is visibly 
constructed in a catachrestic manner, lacking both a literal referent where 
ontologies might be located and an “original” which might be copied and 
cited.
Dislodged from the body, gender will be seen as constructed 
through institutions and discourses; foregrounded as both product and 
process, passing will reveal itself as series of performance acts of 
oscillation and transgression between boundaries, categories, and 
subjectivities. As an instance of transgression, gender passing often 
appears as a threat: it threatens the order believed to have been solid; it 
threatens identity categories thought to have been securely planted in our 
bodies; threatens positions of domination and hegemony, with all their
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rights and privileges, which are now “usurped,” as Lynn Friedli puts it 
(qtd. in Ginsberg 13), by the passer.
As much as one might agree with Juda Bennett in seeing the term 
passing “inelegant” (36), its original meaning—coming from the slip of 
paper that, preventing slaves from being taken fór fugitives, granted free 
movement to them (36)—can be transferred to the realm of gender too. 
As such, by gender passing I will mean that elaborate performance 
through which the “passing figure” will be allowed free movement as the 
person produced in this performance. By opposing power relations, the 
passer will violate the norms of subjection and critique discursive 
boundaries; by what Gayatri Spivak calls “enabling violation” in the post- 
colonial context (Spivak Reader 19), the passer will be self-constructed as 
a subject with agency.
1. Gender passing: full passing and play passing (gender play)
Gender passing, just like its constituent term gender, exhibits a 
strong asymmetry: instead of referring equally to passing in either 
direction, it highlights the marked elements—“gender” as an attribute of 
woman—as its target configuration. In other words, in the transparent 
meaning of gender passing, womanhood—as the marked element of the 
man/woman binary—will be the predominant identity inflection targeted. 
This is so in spite of the fact that asymmetrical power relations would 
privilege the reverse—as they do in the case of race passing, where the 
predominant direction of passing is from the disempowered black position 
to the more powerful white position. In my reading there is a very 
important reason fór this gender asymmetry: while man’s is the obvious, 
unmarked/unseen, and transparent position, woman’s is palpable, 
marked/seen, and opaque (to continue the transparency/opacity metaphor). 
She is the one who “has” gender, whose gender is more obviously “made,” 
its constructedness visible and legible, therefore the technologies available 
fór its imitative construction in passing are more prevalent.
Moreover, the transgression of the woman who passes as a mán is 
more serious: she will be a usurper of male privilege indeed, a female 
Prometheus who steals the fire—this time nőt from Zeus bút mán in 
generál. The woman transgressor seems to commit a grave crime when 
she dissociates masculinity—which, as Judith Halberstam explains, is still 
the property of the white male heterosexual (2)—from the male body. In
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this case, part of woman’s crime, I would add, is that masculinity’s 
appropriation by the female body makes a most subversive claim 
unambiguously: that masculinity is as much of a construction as femininity. 
Gender passing from female to male, in other words, will undo the 
marked/unmarked distinction by foregrounding the constructedness of the 
“unmarked universal” subject, and will alsó undo unmarked as dominant 
and invisible equation (see Lisa Walker 14). Female masculinity is 
obviously one such instance when masculinity leaves the male body: this 
is masculinity in women which appears as the ultimate transgression; this 
is the appropriation nőt only of gender bút alsó of power, as well as of 
unmarked transparency. (Masculinity’s wider reassignment to the female 
body is a rather recent phenomenon only, part of “postmodem cool,” as 
Susan Bordo points out [Male Body 41]). In spite of the many examples of 
cross-dressing, female-to-male transsexuals, thirdness, or cross-identifying 
women (which Halberstam cites throughout Female Masculinity), this 
female masculinity has nőt found its entry in literature to the degree a 
man’s passing fór a woman has. I too will discuss the mechanism of gender 
passing through examples only where womanhood is being performed.
Gender passing is a most complex phenomenon. I will differentiate 
between two kinds of passing from the perspective of binaries, both 
revealing, in Butler’s words, “gender itself to be an imitation” {Psychic 
145). Both are, moreover, parodies “of the idea of the natural and the 
original” {Gender Trouble 31), since what they copy are technologies and 
nőt “essences.” Of the two kinds, the first refers to the replacement of one 
pole fór the other in the system of binaries; this is the case when a mán 
“passes over” fór a woman. This type, which I will call full passing, is 
always the staging of existing normative identities. The other kind, which 
I call play passing, or gender play, is the interrogation and subversion of 
the binary system; as such, these instances can be seen as the 
performative creations of new ontologies. It is much like mimicry, to 
adopt the meaning of Horni Bhabha’s concept of colonial mimicry: of 
wanting to be “almost the same, bút nőt quite” (86). While full passing 
aims to deceive (to be altogether “the same”), gender play seems to 
purposefully reveal its own transgression by constantly producing its own 
slippage. While the first is a deadly serious game, where the stakes are 
high indeed, in the second playfulness is a key factor.
I will start with full passing. By openly deploying imitative-mimetic 
processes taken from the “other” in the binary, this performance 
foregrounds the theatrical hasis of gender and race, and gives a high
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visibility to playful repetition or mimé—to be reenacted by a person of 
the “opposite” gender or race. As a narrative which “assumes that there is 
a self that masquerades as another kind of self,” as Halberstam puts it, full 
passing will limit gender or race Identification by allowing movement 
between the binaries of mán and woman or black and white only. This 
binary understanding of passing—when the passer can only step from one 
category intő the “opposite” other—involves the either/or logic of power 
relations. Concomitantly, there is often a morál element involved: the 
passer is considered a trespasser, while passing is seen as deception, “an 
attempt to claim status and privilege falsely” (Ginsberg 8). This element 
of deception, as well as the claiming of privilege falsely, is present even 
in instances where the passer masquerades as belonging to the 
subordinated group: when a mán passes as a woman. In these instances, 
however, as I will show, the male passer assumes only more power (in the 
legal, sexual, or political aréna) by masquerading as woman.
Bút, as I mentioned above, this is only one kind of passing, from 
one pole to the other. There exists that other kind too, play passing or 
mimicry, where the passer refuses the logic of dichotomous thinking and 
assumes both gender and race to be hybrid categories, occupying a 
continuum rather than opposite poles. So, together with the insistence of 
passing as “almost the same, bút nőt quite” comes a multiplication of 
categories fór constructions between the two poles. It is playful 
approximation and in-betweenness, as well as the opening of the field fór 
new, transitional categories.
Confounding the logic of binary thinking, gender play will allow fór 
new possibilities of gender configurations to come about by showing that 
all identities are constructed, acted out, through a series of normative 
performances (when woman performs femininity, fór example). Once 
femininity leaves the body of the woman, what was purportedly the 
“essential” site naturalized fór its performance, gender ceases to be a 
binary category: nőt conforming to the two poles of the binary, gender 
will be constructed at variable or random points of the continuum, making 
fór multiple and contingent gender categories (depending, fór example, on 
the imbrications of other identity categories such as race, eláss, sexuality, 
nationality). Moreover, gender play will contribute to the fundamental 
destabilization of the categories themselves, creating a “category erisis” 
defined by Marjorie Garber as “a failure of definitional distinction, a 
borderline that becomes permeable, that permits of bordér crossings from 
one (apparently distinct) category to another” (16)
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Let me give somé examples. George Harris’s Spanish masquerade 
and Eliza Harris’s cross-dressing in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tóm ’s 
Cabin satisfy all the specifications of full passing: they aim at deception, 
wanting to fully enact the “other” race and gender, and make somé 
alterations on their bodies. George’s full passing is proclaimed a 
“dangerous game” (123), one of life and death, where he nőt only dresses 
up as a Spanish gentleman bút changes his skin and hair color too:
“I am pretty well disguised, I fancy,” said the young mán, with a smile.
“little walnut bark has made my yellow skin a genteel brown, and I’ve 
dyed my hair black; so you see I don’t answer to the advertisement at 
all.” (123)
Similarly, when, in another deadly serious game, Eliza dresses up as 
a mán before Crossing Laké Erié, she adapts “her slender and pretty form 
the articles of man’s attire,” cuts her “black curly hair” (410), and is 
leaming to take long steps in an effort to “try to look saucy” (412). No 
slippage is allowed in either case; otherwise they would be caught and 
returned to their owners. Historically, cross-dresser women in the Civil 
War, of whom there were probably around four hundred, according to 
Elizabeth Young (184), made every attempt to perform full passing. One 
of the better-known passers, Loretta Velasquez/Lt. Harry Buford went as 
far as “combining gender masquerade with heterosexual seduction” 
(Young 192). Bút, to take an example of gender play, George Sand sports 
a masculine look by wearing pants and smoking cigars without wanting to 
pass fully as a mán; hers is a performance that meant to reveal its 
slippage. The effort to nőt fully hide bút highlight this playful slippage 
from a linguistic-orthographic perspective is there even in the name 
George, spelled purposefully differently from the French way, without an 
5. If much of passing is about visibility—or “specularity,” as Ginsberg 
claims (2)—then this kind of gender play is much about making the 
slippage visible too.
Wholly constructed in processes that challenge biology, gender 
passing provides a serious argument against gender essentialism. Of 
course, both full passing and gender play relate to biology in certain 
ways: the first attempts at somé alterations of the body, “biology” (like 
skin or hair), while the second applies changes on the body, bút usually 
nőt to the body. Bút nőt even do the alterations performed on the body in 
full passing involve radical sex changes as in the case of 
transgendered/transsexed bodies, fór example. We could say that sex is
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made irrelevant in both forms of gender passing; it is through gendering 
instituitions and practices only that gender performance is conducted. All 
gender traits will be produced by gendering institutions, discourses, 
practices, and performances independent of whether mán performs 
womanhood (in the Mark Twain text), or, in the case of the as yet 
“unsexed” child’s performance, a woman comes about without regard to 
biology (in the Nabokov text).
Gender passing, finally, usually does nőt occur within one category 
only, bút involves other inflections of identity too, like race and sexuality. 
Since identities are nőt made up of single inflections bút are formed of 
complex imbrications of such inflections, the passing figure will most 
often be seen as passing along more than one axis. Therefore, gender 
passing will involve, more often than nőt, additional forms of passing, 
between white/black, straight/gay, genuine/fake, original/copy, 
subject/object, fór example.
I tűm now to my two texts informed by gender passing.
2. Full passing: (cross-)dressing and constructing the body:
Mark Twain, Is He Dead?
Mark Twain’s laté comedy Is He Dead? was thought to have been 
lost fór over a hundred years. Written in Vienna in 1898, it was published 
in 2003 only, just in time perhaps to offer another supporting argument 
fór theories on the performative construction of the subject.
The play was inspired by the fate of what was considered the most 
famous painting of the time, The Angelus of Jean-Fran90Ís Millet, the 
object of an “intense bidding war” between Francé and America (see 
Fishkin 159), to sell finally fór the amazing price of 550,000 francs. The 
issue problematized in the play concerns the fact that while artists are 
unable to sell their paintings during their lives, heirs and art dealers make 
fortunes on these same paintings after the death of the artists. The Millet 
in Twain’s play cannot sell a single painting, nőt even the one recognized 
as a masterpiece by all, The Angelus, and nőt fór the meager sum of 275 
or even one hundred francs. Bound by a contract to the villain of the play, 
the art dealer Bastien André, who wants to ruin the painter, Millet and his 
pupils decide to stage the master’s death. Giving him three “last months” 
to enjoy his Creative frenzy and to introduce Millet’s heir, his “twin 
sister” “Widow Daisy Tillou” (played by the cross-dressing Millet of
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course), they first spread the news of his imminent death, then start 
selling his paintings. Somé of the same buyers appear, now happy to pay 
80,000 francs fór pieces they refused to buy fór a hundred earlier. The art 
dealer alsó reappears, insisting that he owns the pictures (the same which 
he considered invaluable before) by contract. Having to attend his own 
funeral, Millet/Widow Tillou now must find a way to get rid of the art 
dealer, who wants to marry the widow in exchange fór burning the 
contract. The painter passing as his own twin sister takes a desperate step 
and performs a peculiar Swiftian undressing ceremony fór André, who 
thinks he is unnoticed in the room, as she removes her wig, glass-eye, 
false teeth, and even wooden legs. Having successfully disposed of 
André, Millet reveals the whole theatrics to his grieving fiancée, together 
with the new plán that he will reenter art life under the name of Piacidé 
Duval, a “marvelously successful imitator of the laté lamented” (128)— 
and the whole victorious gang rejoices to the simultaneous sound of the 
Marseillaise, Yankee Doodle, God Savé the Queen, and Die Wacht am 
Rhein.
Three circumstances are relevant from the perspective of my 
argument: Millet’s passing as a woman, the foregrounding of “her” 
constructed body, and the plán to reintroduce Millet as his own imitator. 
Of course, these incidents are nőt without parallel in Twain’s works. Male 
cross-dressing appears in several Twain texts, among them Huckleberry 
Finn and Pudd’nhead Wilson, fitting well intő his larger fascination with 
doubles and duplicities. Throughout his career Twain was intrigued by 
mistaken identities and the dilemma, described by Susan Gillman, as 
“whether one can teli people apart, differentiate among them” (5). 
Clemens, who took the rather revealing pseudonym Twain, was fascinated 
by masks, twins, double personalities, look-alikes, impersonators, as well 
as impostures: “the pose of a pose, the fake of a fake” (Gillman 6). He 
liked to amuse his audience with what he called “doublejokes,” those that 
“aimed at deceiving the listener bút at making him pleasurably conscious 
of his own deception” (Gillman 21). The idea of the constructed body alsó 
appears in somé other pieces, such as “Aurelia’s Unfortunate Young 
Mán,” Roughing It, and “The Lowest Animál” (see Fishkin 181). 
Moreover, the mán who only wore his famous white suit in his seventies 
was nőt only eccentric bút transgressive too: “why nőt adopt somé of the 
women’s styles?” he asked, justifying his “Dress Reform” by linking it to 
gender roles (qtd. in Gillman 186).
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So, to return to my first point, the Widow’s cross-dressing 
performance is a convincing full passing to the degree that even Millet’s 
fiancée is deceived. This is so in spite of the fact that it is difficult fór him 
to “endure these awkward clothes” (63) and that he appears smoking a 
pipe (62). Moreover, since the Widow is unable to present a coherent 
story of her own life, she must be seen as having a “touched” mind (86), 
as being “eccentric” and “a little crazed by this great sorrow” (82). Nőt 
only does she give a fantastic account of having “slathers” of children 
(88), “seven in two years” (89), of having nőt just sons and daughters bút 
a “considerable variety” (91) of children, from a “whole colony” of 
husbands (89), bút—and this is her most severe transgression—she uses 
very unladylike language, teliing André, fór example, that he is “a mean, 
cowardly, contemptible, base-gotten damned scoundrel” (99). All these 
forms of slippage should give away the mimicry. Bút nőt even does 
Millet’s fiancée see through the performance, although she does find the 
Widow “queer” (115). Bút no slippage is noticed, because, as Twain 
seems to suggest, people will believe what they want to believe. As Millet 
claims at the end (ironically about Francé only), “[w]hen Francé has 
committed herself to the expression of a belief, she will die a hundred 
thousand deaths rather than confess she has been in the wrong” (143).
Millet’s passing, however, involves more than gender: he alsó 
transgresses object/subject categories, or, in this case categories of agency. 
Instead of allowing André to act as his agent art dealer, Millet and his 
friends decide to claim agency in a very particular way, by making himself 
intő his own agent, even if he needs to pass as a dead mán fór that.
Second, it is the constructed body pár excellence which is being 
reenacted during the performance which the Widow puts on in order to 
scare away the art dealer. This performance seems to be exactly the 
reverse of Corinna’s disassembling herself in Swift’s “A Beautiful Young 
Nymph Going to Bed”: in this comedy, the “woman” starts out without 
her body, as having bút one eye, no hair, no teeth, and no legs; all the 
missing parts will be supplied during her self-construction, during which 
she assembles herself intő a “supremely beautiful” woman (135). Con- 
fronted with the prospect of having a wife who has no part that is 
“genuine” (138) or “solid” (139), André is of course happy to sneak out 
and nőt “marry that débris if she was worth a billión” (139). In this 
performance nőt only are the boundaries of gender transgressed, bút those 
between “genuine” and “fake” too.
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Third, with Millet’s markét value sky-rocketing in the art world, the 
pupils decide to continue tapping the artist’s Creative energies and 
introduce him as a Millet-imitator. They find a name fór him too, Piacidé 
Duval, who would now supply an unlimited flow of Millet-imitations. 
Twain deconstructs the original/copy binary by giving primacy to the 
copy as that which will make the original original (and more valuable). 
Indeed, the copy is shown to be valued over the original when sold fór 
hundreds of thousands, and the Englishman buys the original of The 
Angelus as a worthless copy. Bút, as Millet himself (still as the Widow) 
observes, people “will never know it” (129). Moreover, it is “a fictitious 
Fran90Ís Millet” (132; emphasis in original) who now passes as his own 
imitator (“Imitator of myself’ [128]); it is fiction that passes as imitation, 
and the original/copy distinction gets conclusively erased.
3. Transgression’s slippage, gender play, or girl performing woman 
(with a difference): Vladimír Nabokov, Lolita
Vladimír Nabokov’s Lolita (1955) foregrounds an instance of 
gender passing usually nőt discussed under the heading of passing: in this 
case it is a preadolescent, a still boyish girl who turns intő a “nymphet” or 
“girleen” {Annotated Lolita 19) in order to pass fór a woman. This növel, 
subverting in other ways too the stability of identity (we need only to 
think of the Humbert-Quilty doubling or characters described as having 
“a salad of racial genes” [9] or “mixed parentage” [11]), puts in its center 
the cárnál desire of the grown mán fór “pale pubescent girls” (16), or 
“girl-children” (16)—whether called Annabel or Dolores. The object of 
his desire is the nymphet, the Dolores/Lolita who is nőt a child any more 
bút nőt a woman yet either.
The nymphet fór Nabokov occupies a stage between girlhood and 
womanhood, somewhere between nine and fourteen, as he writes in the 
növel (16). Fór the Nabokov who made his name in lepidoptery by 
collecting and identifying butterflies, the nymphet corresponds to the 
“pupa” stage of insects undergoing metamorphosis. In fact, he emphasized 
this transitional nymphet-stage of the pupa when naming one of his 
lepidopterological finds “Nabokov’s Wood-Nymph” (see Annotated Lolita 
339). Expanding this nymphet/pupa metaphor, the author/lepidopterist 
gives the evocative name “nympholepts” to the “lőne voyagers” who have 
a passión fór collecting these nymphets (17).
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Dolores the child only plays with the mán first, when she still rather 
innocently sits on his knees or sneaks up to him from the back and plays 
peek-a-boo. Her transformation is marked by her first applying lipstick 
and eating a “banal, Eden-red apple” (58). She becomes a nymphet by 
responding to Humbert’s desire and becoming his creation: “my own 
creation, another, fanciful Lolita” (62), who starts to see herself as a 
“starlet” (65). When she “flows” intő his arms, he realizes it was him who 
“willed intő being” this “ineffable” life (113), while on her part it was 
“bút an innocent game ... in imitation of somé simulacrum of fake 
románcé” (113). At this stage the twelve year old Lolita is still a pupa: 
half-child, munching on candy hars and ice cream cones, and half- 
woman, flirting with the mán in a seemingly innocent manner, thinking 
(seemingly) that they are lovers already. While laughing in a childish 
manner with a “young golden giggle” (119), she seems to know that their 
relationship verges on “incest” (119). She becomes a good performer 
when her performance involves the copying of copies, or the imitation of 
simulacra of fakeness—as all nymphets do, Nabokov suggests, when, in 
an effort to pass fór a woman, they imitate “the cheapest of cheap cuties” 
(120). Lolita does nőt aim at full passing: her performance is play 
passing, mimicry rather, and the in-betweenness of this “fey child” is 
emphasized in various ways.
A combination of naíveté and deception, of charm and vulgarity, of blue 
sulks and rosy mirth, Lolita, when she chose, could be a most 
exasperating brat. I was nőt really quite prepared fór her fits of 
disorganized boredom, intense and vehement griping, her sprawling, 
droopy, dopey-eyed style, and what is called goofing off—a kind of 
diffused clowning which she thought was tough in a boyish hoodlum 
way. (148)
Both a girl of “very childish appearance” and one who, “owing 
perhaps to constant amorous exercise,” radiated “somé special languorous 
glow” (159), she is the ultimate pupa, at home both in children’s libraries 
and in bed with Humbert on “violent momings” (160). The “most 
mythopoetic nymphet in October’s orchard-haze” (186), who in school 
gives the impression that she is “morbidly uninterested in sexual matters” 
(195), yet knows exactly how to tempt Humbert when saying, “Carry me 
upstairs, please. I feel sort of romantic to-night” (207).
What is very important in the növel is that Lolita’s construction is 
carried out as much by Humbert as Lolita. In other words, it is the man’s 
desire which constitutes the nymphet, who responds to this desire by her
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self-construction. Bút what Humbert desires is nőt the “powdered” 
butterfly of a grown woman (12), bút a pupa in metamorphosis, a 
transgressor from girlhood to womanhood. It is this in-betweenness which 
tums him on, giving him an “incestuous thrill” (80): seeing the nymphet 
verging on womanhood, the daughter turnéd intő lover, child intő woman, 
boy intő girl even. He will nőt want to be wholly deceived; he does nőt 
demand full passin from Lolita (in fact, once a mature woman, a mother, 
she does nőt interest him any more). His obsession is rather with 
transgression itself: the complete destabilization of categories—
metamorphosis, transitionality, in-betweenness, slippage.
* * *
I would like to conclude my paper by reiterating the following claims.
First, gender passing presents new counter-arguments to the 
essentialist position. Whether woman becomes woman, mán becomes 
mán or, indeed, woman becomes mán or mán becomes woman, gender is 
shown as a discursive construct constituted by bodies whose biological 
markers have been made irrelevant.
Second, given the constructions of passing in these texts (French 
male artist to female sibling, nymphet to woman), gender’s catachrestic 
character gets highlighted: it is shown to be a metaphor lacking its 
referent in “reality.” The “original” biological sex of the gender performer 
is made totally inconsequential: the “authenticity” of the performance has 
nothing to do with whether the performer is “originally” a mán or a 
woman. In fact, there are no “original” or “true” genders to be “copied” 
when performed. It is nőt something “out there” which is cited, evoked, or 
imitated when gender is being performed; rather, those processes are 
iterated whereby gender is constructed again and again in discourse.
Third, the texts show differences in terms of agency and the degree 
to which they each reproduce existing scripts. The full passer, who 
follows normative scripts of gender performance can lay little claim to 
agency other than overriding “original” biological sex; here the “new” 
gender will be performed simply by way of letting oneself be interpellated 
by a powerful ideology, somé well-know script of womanhood. Yet 
agency does get to be problematized in texts of gender passing too, 
especially in gender play. Gender play will nőt only come about from 
shifting back and forth between gender constructions (which can happen
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in full passing too), bút from the trying out of positions of in-betweenness 
and multiplicity, and the revealing of various forms of slippage.
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